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 ABSTRACT 
Industry Trade-Balance and Domestic Merger Policy:  Some Empirical 
Evidence from the U.S. 
by Joseph A. Clougherty 
The literature on antitrust in an open-economy setting is inconclusive with 
respect to the role played by trade-balance on the tenor of domestic merger 
policy. Using a panel data set composed of US merger reviews by industrial 
sector over the 1997-2001 period, I empirically test the impact of sectoral trade 
balance on the level of antitrust scrutiny. The results suggest that larger trade 
balances lead to more vigorous antitrust scrutiny; thus, ‘strategic’ merger policy 
does not appear evident, and consumer-surplus appears to guide US merger 
policy even under the lure of international competitive gains. 
 
Keywords:  Merger Policy, International Effects, Open Economy 
JEL Classification:  L40, L00, L40 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Empirische Evidenz über den Zusammenhang von Leistungsbilanz und 
Fusionspolitik in den U.S.A. 
Die ‚anti-trust’-Literatur bezogen auf eine offene Volkswirtschaft sagt wenig 
dazu aus, welche Rolle die Leistungsbilanz für die Fusionspolitik eines Landes 
spielt.  In diesem Papier wird anhand von Paneldaten, in denen die Berichte der 
Fusionskontrolle in unterschiedlichen Industrien der U.S.A. über einen Zeitraum 
von 1997-2001 zusammengestellt sind, empirisch getestet, welchen Effekt die 
Leistungsbilanzen - nach Industriezweigen unterteilt - auf das Niveau der ‚anti-
trust’-Kontrolle haben.  Die Ergebnisse der Tests deuten an, dass mit größerem 
Leistungsbilanzgewicht auch eine strengere ‚anti-trust’-Kontrolle einhergeht. 
Folglich ist eine ‚strategische’ Fusionspolitik der U.S.A. nicht zu erkennen. 
Stattdessen scheint die US-amerikanische Fusionspolitik stark vom 
Verbrauchernutzen geleitet zu sein, trotz der Verheißung internationaler 
Wettbewerbsvorteile. 
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1. Introduction 
A voluminous literature (e.g., Williamson, 1968; Fisher, 1987; White, 1987; Farrell & 
Shapiro, 1990) exists considering the welfare effect of mergers involving only domestic 
competitive implications: i.e., domestic merger activity within a closed economy. Globalization, 
however, is fast fictionalizing the notion that a merger—even one with the acquirer and target 
firm headquartered in the same nation—can be completely embedded within one nation 
(Melamed, 2000). Accordingly, the intersection between trade and competition policy—a 
previously neglected topic—has recently received a great deal of scholarly attention (e.g., 
Richardson, 1999; Vandenbussche, 2000; Horn & Levinsohn, 2001). Further, and closer to the 
topic at hand, a growing dialogue exists on the design of merger policy in an open economy 
setting (e.g., Barros & Cabral, 1994; Levinsohn, 1997; Head & Ries, 1997; Neven & Roller, 
2000a, 2000b; Mavrodis & Neven, 2001; Zhang & Chen, 2002). Such debate is particularly 
healthy as the globalization of mergers and acquisitions suggests that larger nations with 
commitments to antitrust (e.g., the U.S.) will increasingly face the dilemmas previously 
experienced by mid-sized nations with commitments to antitrust (e.g., the U.K. & Germany). 
The question motivating this work is how does industry trade-balance (a net-exporter or 
net-importer profile) impact the tenor of merger policy for a specific industry sector. Within the 
above dialogue on merger policy in an open economy setting exists a sub-literature that 
specifically considers the impact of industry trade balance on optimal domestic merger policy. 
Invoking various oligopolistic scenarios, Barros & Cabral (1994), Levinsohn (1997), Sorgard 
(1997), Head & Ries (1997), Yano (2001) and Zhang & Chen (2002)—all find positive 
(negative) trade balances to conditionally favor more lenient (strict) domestic merger policy. 
Explicit in all these works is that antitrust agencies face a national-welfare criterion of which 
foreign producers and consumers are not part. However, Neven and Roller (2000a, 2000b) note 
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that consumer-surplus (not national-welfare) is the stated criterion for many antitrust agencies, 
and further show little scope for conflict when regulators maximize that objective function. 
Additionally, Landes and Posner (1981), Ghosal (2002) and others make the intuitive argument 
that imports ameliorate anticompetitive behavior in domestic markets. Thus suggesting the 
converse of above: positive (negative) trade balances conditionally favor more strict (lenient) 
domestic merger policy. Such discord is made more problematic once one recognizes the 
political economic nature of antitrust, the dangers of using ‘strategic’ merger policy, and the 
bureaucratic discretion held by most antitrust authorities. 
It remains difficult then to theoretically predict how trade balance impacts the tenor of 
domestic merger policy. Solving how—and whether—an industry trade profile (net-exporter/net-
importer) alters domestic merger policy is ultimately an empirical question. Consequently, I test 
here the impact of trade-balance on merger-policy outcomes in the various US industrial sectors. 
A comprehensive panel data set—covering US (both FTC & DOJ) merger policy at the two-digit 
SIC code over the 1997-2001 period—allows testing whether trade-balance acts to promote strict 
or lenient merger policy. The empirical results tentatively support higher trade balances leading 
to stricter merger policy.  
The paper is organized as follows to support the analysis. Section 2 reviews the 
competing theories on how trade-balance might impact the nature of domestic merger policy and 
formulates two competing propositions that motivate the empirical testing. Section 3 presents the 
results of the empirical tests. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Theories and Competing Proposition Formulation 
 Barros and Cabral (1994) sparked the sub-literature on trade balance and the optimal 
tenor of domestic merger policy in an open-economy setting with their extension of Farrell and 
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Shapiro’s (1990) pioneering approach to mergers in a closed-economy. The Barros and Cabral 
set-up consequently conforms rather closely to that of Farrell and Shapiro in a number of 
dimensions. First, the adoption of Farrell and Shapiro’s external-effect decision criterion where 
mergers are assumed to be profitable for the merging parties; hence, a positive net impact on 
non-merging parties (non-merging home firms and home consumers) is a sufficient condition for 
supporting a merger. Second, the employment of Farrell and Shapiro's innovative infinitesimal 
method: a technique consisting of defining the effect of a merger as the sum of many 
infinitesimal price increases which allows capturing the merger effect by investigating the impact 
of an infinitesimal price increase and specifying sufficiency conditions for the sign of the 
marginal price increase to be valid.  
In extending the Farrell and Shapiro (1990) set-up, however, Barros and Cabral (1994) 
find a somewhat counterintuitive result: the more foreign competition faced by a national 
economy, the less likely will a domestic merger enhance national welfare. Recall that under 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) a positive external effect keys on the increased profitability of non-
merging firms; yet, Barros and Cabral (1994) point out that when non-merging firms are mostly 
foreign (e.g., in a net-importer industry) then the external effect is more likely to be negative. 
The converse is true for exporting economies: in this case, the positive external effect is more 
readily satisfied, as the profit gains of domestic firms are more likely to outweigh domestic 
consumer losses. Consequently, net-exporter nations reap the majority of a merger's positive 
effects, while net-importer nations reap the majority of the merger’s negative effects. 
 Sorgard's (1997) study follows closely Barros and Cabral’s work (adopting the 
infinitesimal method, the lack of merger synergies and post-merger price increases), but discards 
the external-effect criterion for a national-welfare criterion. Sorgard points out that a price-
increasing merger in a net-importer nation will unambiguously harm home-nation welfare, as the 
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deadweight loss and increased import expenditures go unmitigated. Conversely, domestic 
mergers in a net-exporter nation can enhance home-nation welfare when the price-cost margin 
from the world market is greater than that in the domestic market; i.e., less competitive foreign 
firms favor a domestic merger improving home-nation welfare. 
 Zhang and Chen (2002) take a different approach and consider the presence of scale 
economies for domestic mergers in an open economy setting. They extend Krugman’s (1984) 
work on the ability of trade policy to promote exports by allowing competition policy to also 
promote exports. Zhang and Chen thus find that domestic mergers in exporter industries more 
readily improve home-nation welfare due to the shift in oligopolistic rents from foreign to home 
producers. They further observe that exports lower the critical economies-of-scale value 
necessary for permitting a domestic merger: i.e., when domestic mergers result in enhanced 
international rents, then less merger synergies are required for home-nation welfare 
enhancement. 
 Even, Head and Ries (1997)—who argue that the prevailing antitrust authorities will 
block non-synergistic domestic mergers which reduce world welfare—find a net-exporter 
dynamic in their model of decentralized merger regulation, as national-welfare maximizing 
authorities can not be trusted with synergistic domestic mergers which reduce world welfare. 
Head and Ries state “a home country government is less likely to approve a merger if the 
merging firms’ rivals are owned by foreigners” (1997: 1119). Further, two additional studies 
(Levinsohn, 1997; Yano, 2001) that take even more varied modeling decisions also find domestic 
mergers more readily improving home-nation welfare under net-exporter status.  
 In sum, the above studies cover a number of different cases—a necessity when it comes 
to oligopolistic market structures—yet all the studies contain a clear and common contention 
concerning the relationship between a national industry's trade-balance and optimal merger 
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policy. The common intuition behind the studies runs along the following lines: national 
welfare—with the typical producer-gains/consumer-losses tradeoff—is the ultimate criterion for 
domestic merger reviews (even Barros & Cabral’s (1994) approach is meant as a short-cut to 
national welfare), and in an open-economy setting home producer gains are more (less) likely to 
outweigh any potential home consumer losses when an industry is characterized by net-exporter 
(net-importer) status. Put differently, the producer-gain/consumer-loss tradeoff begins to vanish 
when the consumers involved are foreign; instead, the search for international rents guides policy 
(Levinsohn, 1997). Consequently, antitrust officials face a national welfare incentive to practice 
lax reviews of domestic mergers in net-exporter industries and strict reviews in net-importer 
industries. The following proposition captures the public policy implications of the above 
literature stream: 
Proposition A: Greater (lesser) trade-balances for a national industry sector 
favor more lenient (strict) reviews of domestic merger activity under national-
welfare maximizing antitrust objectives. 
Many antitrust officials (particularly from the EU and US) are loath to engage in any 
discussion of antitrust rationales that contain national-champion foundations (even if confined to 
net-exporter industries); though, a read through the OECD (1998) annual reports on member 
nation competition policies indicates this discretion is not universally shared. The main argument 
often used to counter any national rent-seeking notions is that national-welfare is simply not the 
criterion used for merger decisions. Neven and Roller (2000a, 2000b) point out that the stated 
objective of many antitrust agencies (including the US and EU) is the promotion of consumer-
surplus and not national-welfare. For example Mario Monti, European Commissioner for 
Competition, recently reiterated that the Competition Directorate General’s "ultimate policy goal 
is the protection of consumer welfare" (Monti, 2002: 71). Neven and Roller (2000a, 2000b) go 
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on to show that if antitrust officials strive to fulfill these goals, then there is little scope for 
conflict between antitrust jurisdictions.  
If consumer-surplus guides merger reviews, then the policy recommendations 
summarized by Proposition A are reversed to recommendations that appear far more intuitive 
from an economist’s perspective: i.e., foreign competition and imports play a more healthy role 
vis-à-vis domestic merger reviews. A number of scholars (e.g., Landes & Posner, 1981; Abbot, 
1985; Ghosal, 2002) have argued that foreign production involves important domestic antitrust 
implications. High imports imply broader geographic markets, dilute concerns over high 
domestic concentration and--via the substitutability of foreign for domestic goods--lessen 
antitrust anxieties with regard to domestic merger activity. In order to fully factor this more 
intuitive link between net-exporter/net-importer status and the tenor of domestic merger reviews, 
two effects must be considered. 
First, import levels (which negatively affect trade balance) involve an obvious 
disciplinary effect in terms of domestic concentration. For instance, if antitrust officials excluded 
foreign competition from a competitive analysis then domestic concentration levels would likely 
overstate market power. Abbott (1985) illustrates the importance of factoring foreign competition 
in the form of imports into any sound estimation of domestic market concentration and market 
power. A strong import presence (reflected by a net-importer industry) reduces the potential 
harm to home consumers from a domestic merger. However, if a national industry is 
characterized by a net-exporter status, then it is less feasible to consider foreign firms as playing 
a mitigating role in terms of domestic anti-competitive behavior: i.e., the more a nation is a net-
exporter, the less likely will foreign firms help ameliorate anticompetitive behavior on the part of 
domestic firms. Consequently, the more a national industry is characterized by a net-importer 
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(net-exporter) status, the more (less) foreign competitors discipline domestic market power and 
guard domestic consumer-surplus.  
Second, the ability of foreign firms to divert output relatively quickly to increases in the 
price-cost markups in domestic markets represents an additional discipline—beyond the absolute 
level of foreign imports—to anticompetitive behavior on the part of domestic firms (Landes & 
Posner, 1981). Yet, foreign competitors are often discounted when it comes to defining domestic 
market concentration and market power, as domestic supply is deemed better able to constrain 
market power than foreign supply (Ordover & Willig, 1983; U.S. DOJ, 1997). The reasoning 
behind this assumption is that the ability of foreign firms to respond quickly to a drop in 
domestic production is constrained. Landes and Posner (1981) contend that the ability of foreign 
producers to divert products quickly to a domestic market undergoing post-merger competitive-
softening depends on the previous crossing of certain thresholds. Ghosal (2002) identifies three 
particular threshold domains: 1) foreign firms will need to have previously overcome trade and 
entry barriers; 2) foreign firms will need to have previously overcome distribution and 
advertising barriers; 3) foreign production costs will need to be relatively low in order to offset 
tariffs and transport costs. Note that the more a domestic industry is characterized by net-
importer status, the more these qualifications have previously been overcome: i.e., net-importer 
status suggests that trade-entry-distribution-advertising barriers have been overcome, and that 
foreign firms have superior efficiency relative to domestic firms. Consequently, the more a 
nation is a net-importer, the more foreign supply acts as a ‘full’ source of market discipline for 
anticompetitive domestic practices. 
The following proposition captures the gist of the public policy implications suggested by 
the above discussion: 
8    
 
 
 
Proposition B: Greater (lesser) trade-balances for a national industry sector 
favor more strict (lenient) reviews of domestic merger activity under consumer-
surplus maximizing antitrust objectives.  
Propositions A and B seemingly reduce to whether a nation targets national-welfare or 
consumer-surplus as the objective function for merger policy; thus, suggesting that empirical 
tests—as proposed and conducted here—might be a trivial exercise. Yet such an abstraction 
suffers from three detractions: 1) the opening up of antitrust to political economic determinants; 
2) the dangers of engaging in ‘strategic’ merger policy; 3) the bureaucratic discretion held by 
antitrust officials. 
First off, the analysis until this point has taken an implicit ‘public interest’ approach to 
explaining antitrust outcomes; yet, a number of scholars (Pittman, 1977; Faith, Leavens & 
Tollison, 1982; Coate, Higgins & McChesney, 1990; Clougherty, 2002) consider antitrust 
outcomes to be—at least partially—subject to political pressure. For instance, Neven, 
Papandropoulos and Seabright (1998) find that firms experiencing difficult antitrust reviews tend 
to engage in greater lobbying activity vis-à-vis the European Commission. Further, Neven and 
Roller (2000) hypothesize that consumer-surplus standards may be optimal in the sense that 
producer-surplus (the other element of a national-welfare analysis) will express itself via the 
political process (note also that consumer-interests suffer from an obvious collective action 
handicap). Thus under the case of a consumer-surplus maximizing antitrust authority, the 
additional producer gains reaped by home producers in post-merger international markets would 
enhance the incentive for merging firms to up their lobbying efforts in order to secure antitrust 
approval (Clougherty, 2002). Consequently, antitrust authorities adopting a consumer-surplus 
merger criterion may still practice more lax merger reviews when national industries are 
characterized as net-exporters; though, in this case the impetus for such lax policies derivates 
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from the enhanced political pressure of domestic producers, as opposed to a ‘public interest’ 
calculation. 
Second, consider a national antitrust authority that adopts a national-welfare objective for 
merger reviews. Even in this case, practicing lax antitrust for net-export industries might suffer 
from many of the same objections—retaliation (Grossman, 1990), minimal actual gains 
(Krugman & Smith, 1994), the nature of oligopolistic competition (Eaton & Grossman, 1986), 
and the bidding up of domestic cost structures (Dixit & Grossman, 1984)—leveled at the 
strategic trade literature. Recall that Zhang and Chen (2002) consider the rationale to be lax with 
mergers in net-exporter industries as akin to Krugman's (1984) rationale for providing subsidies; 
essentially, lax merger reviews are a substitute for a strategic subsidy. Accordingly, practicing 
strategic merger policy might ultimately reduce national welfare; hence, engaging in such a 
policy might not truly maximize national welfare and thus might not be followed. 
Lastly, the stated objectives of antitrust agencies must be understood in the context that 
antitrust officials often have significant bureaucratic discretion (Katzman, 1980; Weingast & 
Moran, 1983). While Neven, Nuttal and Seabright (1993) argue that bureaucratic discretion 
provides space for special interest groups to capture antitrust policy, bureaucratic discretion also 
allows antitrust authorities to follow more informal—or even idiosyncratic—objectives. For 
instance, Neven, Nuttal and Seabright (1993) note that while the EU does not formally provide 
for an efficiency’s defense, efficiencies do appear to have an informal impact on the merger 
review process. Boner and Krueger (1991) observe that antitrust authorities are often charged 
with non-competition related goals such as industrial, employment and regional policies, as well 
as balance of payments. In this vein, Levinsohn (1997) argues that a number of nations contain 
both formal and informal procedures that allow international competitive gains to be factored in 
merger reviews. Even the US—the paragon of strict antitrust policy—allows cartelization for 
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export purposes under the Webb-Pomerene Act (U.S. GAO, 1973). Further, Kovacic and Shapiro 
(2000)—respectively an esteemed legal and economic scholar on antitrust issues—contend that 
declining economic productivity partly drove the lax US antitrust policy of the 1980’s. 
Accordingly, the various antitrust institutional environments (particularly home antitrust 
institutions) appear at least partly amenable to factoring the international-competitive-effects of 
domestic merger activity.  
In sum, it remains difficult to predict how industry trade balance will impact the tenor of 
domestic merger reviews from a theoretical standpoint. As a first-cut, it appears that an antitrust 
authority’s formal criteria—national-welfare or consumer-surplus—might respectively suggest 
whether a net-exporter (net-importer) industry profile leads to more lenient (strict) or strict 
(lenient) merger policy. Yet once we open antitrust policy up to political economic determinants, 
the neat distinction between consumer-surplus and national-welfare driven merger policies 
muddles. Further, practicing lax merger reviews in order to shift international rents toward home 
producers does raise some similar caveats to the case of strategic trade policy (e.g., Branson & 
Klevorick, 1990). Lastly, antitrust authorities often have significant bureaucratic discretion that 
might allow the net-export/net-import status of an industry to be considered during the merger 
review process. Consequently, the role played by an industry’s trade balance on the tenor of 
domestic merger policy is ultimately an empirical question. 
 
3. Empirical Tests and Results 
Data cover US vetted mergers by industrial sector over the 1997-2001 period. The US 
represents one of the hardest cases in which to find international-competitive-effects impacting 
antitrust policy for a few reasons: the US has the longest antitrust tradition; the US has relatively 
strong antitrust institutions; and most importantly, the US has a very large domestic market in 
   
 
  11 
 
which foreign trade and foreign competition still play a relatively small role--i.e., the US is the 
anti-thesis of a small open economy. Accordingly, the US is probably the hardest case to find a 
net-exporter status contributing to lax antitrust or a net-exporter status contributing to strict 
antitrust. Consequently, if one finds international competitive dynamics impacting US merger 
policy, then it is a reasonable assumption to expect to find similar dynamics in other nations—
nations more reliant on the role of foreign competition in protecting domestic consumers, and 
more reliant on foreign trade for industrial competitiveness. 
The data are panel data covering sixty-five industrial sectors over the 1997-2001 period; 
thus, yielding a data set composed of 325 observations. Each panel consists of a two-digit 
industrial sector; for instance, 'Petroleum Refining' is one distinct panel consisting of five annual 
observations (1997-2001). While more specific industrial sector data would be desired (such as 
three or four digit data), US antitrust authorities only report data on antitrust activity at the two-
digit level in the FTC and DOJ’s combined 'Annual Report to Congress on Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Enforcement'.1 Essentially, beyond constructing a data set on a merger-by-merger basis 
from the ground up, this is the best available data on merger enforcement in the US. 
Unfortunately, the state of data on antitrust policy—both within and across nations—is rather 
primitive (Horn & Levinsohn, 2001).  
 Testing the propositions requires two principal variables: a measure of domestic antitrust 
scrutiny (the dependent variable), and a measure of industry trade-balance (the main explanatory 
variable). Beyond the two principal variables, additional variables—the number of intra-industry 
mergers, and the amount of merger activity taking place in the industry, the market share of the 
50 largest firms, and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index (HHI) for the 50 largest firms—are 
introduced in order to capture some of the structural conditions presented by each industry sector 
                                                 
1
 See www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrinfopub.htm for the 1997-2001 ‘Annual Reports to Congress’. 
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and in order to make better causal inferences on the main explanatory variable. The following 
paragraphs explain the variable measures. 
 The dependent variable must capture the state of domestic antitrust scrutiny for a 
particular industry sector. I use the annual number of ’second-request-investigations’ in a 
particular industry sector as indicative of the level of scrutiny given mergers in that sector 
(subsequently referred to as the Antitrust-Scrutiny variable). Second request investigations 
denote serious concerns on the part of US antitrust officials, who will consequently require more 
information from the merging firms, and more time to clear or contest the merger. This level of 
antitrust scrutiny is a pre-requisite for serious remedial measures: such as divestments and 
outright prevention. While a proportion of mergers will be cleared by the ’second-request’ 
procedure, such investigations represent a degree of antitrust holdup for even the cleared 
mergers: as merging firms will be uncertain on the eventual outcome, required to divulge more 
information, and need to wait longer for clearance and completion of their intended strategy. 
Unsurprisingly, many merging parties will call off an intended merger when notified of a 
’second-request’ status. Further, the combined FTC/DOJ ’Annual Report to Congress on Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Enforcement’ reveals this measure of US antitrust scrutiny.2  
 Testing the two competing propositions requires a measure of trade balance to examine 
whether greater trade-balances lead to stricter or more lenient antitrust-scrutiny for an industrial 
sector. The U.S. International Trade Commission reports annual data on the amount of exports 
and imports for two-digit industrial sectors: these measures allow the creation of this variable by 
simply subtracting imports from exports (subsequently referred to as the Trade-Balance 
variable). If proposition A is correct, then trade-balance will negatively affect antitrust-scrutiny: 
i.e., the more a particular industry is characterized by a net-exporter status, the more lenient are 
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US antitrust authorities with regard to mergers. If proposition B is correct, then trade-balance 
will positively affect antitrust scrutiny: i.e., the more a particular industry is characterized by a 
net-exporter status, the more strict are US antitrust authorities with regard to mergers. 
The list of explanatory variables also includes the number of intra-industry mergers 
within the two-digit industrial sector (subsequently referred to as the intra-industry-merger 
variable). Mergers that involve acquirers and targets from the same industrial sector will clearly 
merit more attention than mergers composed of pairs from separate industry sectors. Simply put, 
received wisdom suggests that conglomerate mergers merit the least amount of antitrust concern 
(though largest amount of stockholder concern). The combined FTC/DOJ Annual Report to 
Congress also reveals the number of merger transactions characterized as either two-digit or 
three-digit intra-industry transactions. I expect the Intra-Industry-Mergers variable to positively 
affect Antitrust-Scrutiny; thus, the more intra-industry-mergers in an industrial sector, the more 
antitrust officials should scrutinize the mergers and acquisitions taking place. 
An additional explanatory variable includes the relative amount of merger activity taking 
place in an industrial sector. The already noted FTC/DOJ report provides data on the number of 
notified mergers per year per industrial sector; plus, the US Census Bureau provides data on the 
number of firms per industrial sector.3 These two measures allow the creation of what is 
subsequently referred to as the Industry-Merger-Activity variable: the number of notified 
transactions divided by the total number of firms in the two-digit industrial sector. Industry-
Merger-Activity attempts to capture the degree to which the industry is subject to consolidation: 
with the assumption being that industries undergoing ‘significant’ consolidation merit more 
antitrust-scrutiny than industries undergoing low amounts of consolidation. I expect the Industry-
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 Unfortunately, no other potential measures of antitrust scrutiny—such as number of prohibitions or remedial 
actions—are reported in the Annual Reports. 
3
 See www.census.gov/econguide for information on the ’Core Business Statistics’ for US industrial sectors. 
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Merger-Activity variable to positively affect Antitrust-Scrutiny; thus, industries experiencing a 
relatively high degree of merger activity will experience higher degrees of antitrust scrutiny.  
Finally, the U.S. Census Bureau (1997) provides more specific data—the market-share 
held by the largest 50 firms, and the HHI for the largest 50 firms—on the structural conditions 
for a subset of the industrial sectors (the sectors characterized as manufacturing). These two 
variables (subsequently referred to as TOP50-Market-Share and Top50-HHI) help better control 
for the structural conditions in which merger activity is embedded; thus, a sub-set of the 
regression models include them as control variables. Nevertheless, two opportunity costs are 
presented with the inclusion of these structural variables. First, the number of observations drops 
from 325 to 90, as I was not able to obtain similar measures for non-manufacturing sectors. 
Second, the data derivates from the census of business activity and is thus reported only for 1997 
and not on annual basis; accordingly, the range of empirical tests and model specifications (i.e., 
no fixed effects) are limited by the non-varying nature of these two variables over the 1997-2001 
period. 
 
Econometric Issues 
 Panel data require consideration of a number of econometric issues. This section 
considers and focuses on four issues: 1) the choice between fixed and random effects; 2) whether 
to include period effects; 3) non-linearity in the explanatory variables; 4) potential for 
multicollinearity 
First, panel data usually require a choice between fixed-effects and random-effects. 
Fixed-effect models are called for when the panel-specific effects are unique and unrelated to 
other panels, while random-effect models are often employed when panel specific effects might 
be related amongst panels (Hsiao, 1986; Greene, 1990). While a series of Lagrange Multiplier 
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and Hausman tests favor the choice of fixed-effects over random-effects (Greene, 1995), 
regression models using both specifications are reported in order to underscore the robustness of 
the results and—as alluded to above—to handle the non-varying nature of the Top50-Market-
Share and Top50-HHI variables. 
Second, gradual changes have potentially occurred in the environment for merger & 
acquisitions and merger-reviews over the 1997-2001 period. Changes--beyond those captured by 
the noted explanatory variables—include an ebb-and-flow of overall merger activity (with 2000 
representing the high point with 4926 reported transactions in the US), the increasingly 
international nature of antitrust, relative changes in antitrust budgets, and other developments 
that might impact the state of US merger policy. These changes can create time-specific data 
trends that affect causal inferences; thus, calling for the addition of period effects.  
Third, an additional empirical concern is potential non-linearity in some of the 
explanatory variables, due in part to the left-censored nature of the dependent variable (antitrust-
scrutiny). A number of industry sectors were not subject to ‘second-request-investigations’ in 
particular years; thus, a number of observations are bunched at zero, yet of course, no negative 
values exist for antitrust-scrutiny. Consequently, Trade-Balance, Intra-Industry-Mergers, and 
Industry-Merger-Activity—are all likely to be subject to either increasing or decreasing returns. 
Accordingly, the squared term for all these variables is introduced into all the regression 
equations. Note that Top50-HHI and Top50-Market-Share might also be subject to non-linearity; 
yet, the non-varying nature of these measures over the 1997-2001 period prevents introducing a 
squared term due to collinearity. 
Fourth, the relatively small number of observations (325—and 90 in the data subset) 
raises multi-collinearity concerns. Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients (and means) for 
all variables. It appears that three control variables—Industry-Merger-Activity, Top50-Market-
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Share, and Top50HHI—have some collinear tendencies: correlation coefficients above the 0.5 
benchmark for notice. This does not overly surprise, as all three variables are included to capture 
some of the structural conditions within the industry sector. It is important to recall, however, 
that collinearity does not lead to unbiased estimates—collinearity instead makes it more difficult 
to obtain significant coefficient estimates. No explanatory variables were dropped for collinearity 
concerns, as the main-explanatory variable (Trade-Balance) does not appear subject to 
collinearity; hence, there is no need to invite specification-bias. 
******************** 
Put Table 1 here 
******************** 
The regression models reported in the panel data regression results (Table 2) take the 
above econometric issues into account. While Regression #1 reports the standard OLS 
regression, Regressions’ #2 & #3 incorporate a random effects specification and Regression #4 a 
fixed-effects specification in order to control for any panel-specific effects. Additionally, 
Regression’s #2, #3 & #4 incorporate a period effects specification in order to control for any 
time-specific effects. Further, the squared-term is introduced where possible in all the regression 
equations. While four different regression-models are presented in Table 2, Regression #2 
provides the most comprehensive coverage of the various econometric issues—though 
Regression #4 might be the most rigorous regression model. Accordingly, Regression #3 (a 
random-and-period effects model with a linear functional form) is represented here as follows: 
Antitrust-Scrutinyit = b0 + j=1∑2 bj*(Trade-Balance)jit + j=1∑2 bj+2*(Intra-Industry-Mergers)jit + j=1∑2 
bj+4*(Industry-Merger-Activity)jit + b7*(Top50-Market-Share)it + b8*(Top50-HHI)it + εit + ui + wt 
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where i indexes the 65 industrial sectors, t indexes time, j allows for convenient expression of a 
non-linear variable, ui represents the panel specific effect, and wt captures the period specific 
effect. 
 
Results and Interpretation 
Table 2 presents the empirical results for four regression models. All four regression 
equations indicate moderate model-specification: with R-squares: ranging from .15 in Regression 
#2 to .80 in Regression #4. More importantly, the four models generate consistent results for the 
coefficient estimates—virtually all the common variables point in the same direction. Due to the 
general consistency of results across the regression models, the following analysis and 
interpretation discusses the results as a whole with a variable-by-variable approach. 
The Trade-Balance variable and the squared term for Trade Balance are instrumental in 
testing propositions' A & B. While both Trade-Balance and its squared term indicate positive 
directions in all four regression-models, both variables are only significant (at the 5-% level) in 
Regression #1. Accordingly, the empirical evidence tentatively supports Proposition B over 
Proposition A, as more positive trade-balances lead to more antitrust-scrutiny--and at an 
increasing rate. Nevertheless, it should be reiterated that the reported tests are far from 
conclusive, as statistical significance is not robust.  
The Intra-Industry-Mergers variable and the squared term for that variable are included to 
make better causal inference on the above Trade-Balance variable. We expected and found a 
positive sign for the Intra-Industry-Mergers variable, as mergers between acquirers and targets 
from the same industry should merit further antitrust scrutiny by regulators. While the coefficient 
estimate for Intra-Industry-Mergers is positive in all four regression-models, it is only significant 
(at the 10-% level) in Regression #3. Further, the squared term for Intra-Industry-Mergers 
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indicates a positive sign in Regressions’ #1 & #2 (data based on the manufacturing industrial 
sectors), but negative in Regressions’ #3 & #4 (data based on all industrial sectors); nevertheless, 
the squared-term coefficient estimate is not significant in any of the regression models. 
******************** 
Put Table 2 here 
******************** 
The Industry-Merger-Activity variable appears to be the most robust variable in the 
regression results. The expectation was for greater amounts of merger activity in an industry (i.e., 
the number of notified mergers divided by the number of firms in that industry) to elicit higher 
degrees of antitrust-scrutiny on the part of regulators. This appears to be born out as the 
coefficient estimate for this variable is positive and significant in all four regression models: i.e., 
the more an industry is characterized by intense merger activity relative to the amount of firms, 
the more antitrust officials scrutinize mergers in that industry. In essence, this result conforms to 
Ghosal and Gallo’s (2001) finding that the US DOJ mainly acts as an antitrust law enforcement 
agency (essentially a ‘policeman’). Further, the squared term for Industry-Merger-Activity is 
negative in all the regression equations and significant in three of the four models; accordingly, 
the ‘policeman’ role is moderated at higher levels of merger activity in an industrial sector.  
Lastly, the two additional variables—Top50-Market-Share and Top50-HHI—included 
only in Regressions’ #1 & #2 to better control for the structural conditions in the industry sector 
yield mixed results. First off, the coefficient estimate for Top50-Market-Share exhibits the 
expected positive sign, yet the coefficient estimate for Top50-HHI exhibits a negative sign.  
Nevertheless, neither variable exhibits statistical significance.   
In sum, the empirical results appear to tentatively support proposition B over proposition 
A. There appears to be scant evidence in support of the contention that US antitrust authorities 
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practice more lenient merger policy in industrial sectors characterized by larger trade balances. 
Instead, US antitrust authorities appear to practice stricter merger policy when industrial sectors 
are characterized by larger trade balances—albeit the statistical significance of this result is not 
robust.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The existing literature on merger policy in an open-economy setting presents two 
competing rationales on how sectoral trade balances might impact the tenor of domestic merger 
policy. Some scholars (Barros & Cabral, 1994; Levinsohn, 1997; Sorgard, 1997; Head & Ries, 
1997; Yano, 2001; and Zhang & Chen, 2002) suggest that positive trade balances lead to more 
lenient merger reviews, as a nation’s welfare is enhanced by the producer gains reaped in foreign 
markets. Other scholars (Landes & Posner, 1981; Ghosal, 2002) suggest that positive trade 
balances lead to stricter merger reviews, as consumer welfare is increasingly endangered when 
imports do not represent a disciplinary threat to domestic anti-competitive practices. 
Consequently, the role of trade-balance on domestic merger policy appears to reduce to the 
objective function (national-welfare or consumer-surplus) of a regulator. However, such a 
reduction is made more problematic once one recognizes that merger-reviews are subject to 
political economic dynamics, the dangers of using ‘strategic’ merger policy, and the bureaucratic 
discretion held by most antitrust authorities.   
This paper accordingly takes an empirical approach to shedding light on how trade 
balance might impact the tenor of domestic merger policy. Empirical tests based on a 
comprehensive panel data set—covering US merger policy at the two-digit SIC code level over 
the 1997-2001 period—generate two findings. First, scant evidence exists to support US antitrust 
regulators practicing lenient merger reviews when an industrial sector is subject to positive trade 
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balances. Simply put, US antitrust authorities do not appear to be practicing any form of beggar-
thy-neighbor merger policy. Second, tentative evidence does support US antitrust regulators 
practicing stricter merger reviews when an industrial sector is subject to larger trade balances. 
Consequently, the stated objective function (consumer-surplus) of US antitrust policy does 
appear to guide merger reviews even when the lure of international competitive gains is 
introduced. In sum, the US does not appear to be engaging in ‘strategic’ merger policy, and 
consumer-welfare remains the dominant criterion when US merger policy is analyzed in an open-
economy setting. 
The results here present some interesting extensions and implications. One implication 
pertains to the ongoing WTO talks where harmonization of antitrust polices is being considered. 
One rationale behind harmonization is that it would curb national antitrust authorities from 
engaging in lax merger reviews when the majority of the merger’s deleterious effects are reaped 
in foreign markets. A number of scholars (Bliss, 1997; Klevorick, 1997) have debated the race-
to-the-bottom potential for merger policy in a globalized world. The evidence here, however, 
suggests that such concerns are unfounded when it comes to US merger policy. Which leads to 
an obvious extension of this work: it would be informative to run similar empirical tests with 
medium-sized and small-sized nationals (data limitations aside), as the US is the antithesis of a 
small open economy. The lure of international competitive gains may prove more potent in 
relatively smaller nations. As already noted, a casual read through international reports (e.g., 
OECD, 1998) suggests that many nations do consider the international competitive gains from 
allowing domestic merger activity. 
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficients & Means for All Variables 
 
 Antitrust-
Scrutiny 
Trade-
Balance 
Intra-
Industry-
Mergers 
Industry-
Merger-
Activity 
Top50-
Market-Share 
Top50-HHI 
Mean 1.59 -4691 30.24 0.00256 53.29 202.48 
 
Antitrust-
Scrutiny 
 
1.0      
Trade-
Balance 
 
.00134 1.0 
 
    
Intra-
Industry-
Mergers 
0.6001 0.06105 1.0    
Industry-
Merger-
Activity 
0.30326 -0.02284 0.14488 1.0   
Top50-
Market-Share 
 
0.04622 -0.00714 -0.18238 0.49971 1.0  
Top50-HHI 
 
 
-0.06439 -0.20121 -0.18944 0.57843 0.81758 1.0 
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Table 2: Panel Data Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Antitrust-Scrutiny 
 Regression Models Based on N=90  Regression Models Based on N=325 
 
 Regression #1: 
OLS Estimation 
Regression #2: 
Two-Way Random-
Effects Estimation 
Regression #3: 
Two-Way 
Random-Effects 
Estimation 
Regression #4: 
Two-Way Fixed-
Effects 
Estimation 
Explanatory Variables 
 
    
Trade-Balance 0.000084 ** 
(2.57) 
0.000057 
(1.38) 
0.000043 
(1.57) 
0.00007 
(1.43) 
 
(Trade-Balance)2 1.31E-9 ** 
(2.52) 
2.997 E-10 
(0.57) 
4.59 E-10 
(1.57) 
5.27 E-10 
(1.30) 
 
Intra-Industry-
Mergers 
0.02 
(0.79) 
 
0.003 
(0.14) 
 
0.016 *** 
(3.03) 
 
0.012 
(1.61) 
 
(Intra-Industry-
Mergers)2 
0.000069 
(0.354) 
 
0.000015 
(0.09) 
 
-0.00000955 
(-0.51) 
 
-0.0000078 
(-0.34) 
 
Industry-Merger-
Activity 
252.83 * 
(1.90) 
 
244.47 * 
(1.94) 
 
314.63 *** 
(4.40) 
 
210.74 ** 
(2.06) 
 
(Industry-Merger-
Activity)2 
-6260.87 * 
(-1.92) 
 
-4712.91 * 
(-1.70) 
 
-6232.44 *** 
(-3.40) 
 
-3426.88 
(-1.50) 
 
Top50-Market-Share 0.027 
(1.002) 
 
0.011 
(0.23) 
 
  
Top50-HHI 
 
 
-0.0034 
(-1.29) 
-0.0027 
(-0.63) 
  
Constant 0.203 
(0.165) 
1.76 
(0.85) 
0.61 ** 
(2.08) 
 
0.21 
(0.30) 
 
 
R-squared 
 
.42 
 
.15 
 
.20 
 
.80 
 
(  ) = T-stat 
 
*** = 1% 
Signif. 
 
** = 5% Signif. 
 
* = 10% Signif. 
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